Kyushu Communication Studies. 2005. 3:17-39
©2005 Communication Association of Japan Kyushu Chapter

Communicative Thanatology:

Death as Responsibility in Community

HIRANO Junya[1)]
(Duquesne University)

Abstract. The search for objective knowledge or definition of death is mostly undertaken through philosophical, medical, and judicial discourses; however, a comprehensive view of death cannot be presented without grounding the discourse about death in ethical and relational issues. The individualistic approach toward death only offers a narrow view because the approach limits death within the private sphere, ignoring the fact that it is embedded in human relationships. This study of communication ethics discusses how death can be viewed as a manifestation of responsibility. By relocating the locus of death from the paradigm of subjectivity to the realm of community, death no longer emerges as the most fearful phenomenon, but as a gift which teaches that each individual's life exists in the web of responsibilities called community. In the first section, the study discusses two different views of death as our guiding notions. Martin Heidegger discusses death as angst. In contrast, Emmanuel Levinas theorizes death as responsibility. The second portion of this study explores the connections between death and community to argue that a community is a place where "the death of the other" has its meaning. It also proposes characteristics of community in order to distinguish it from the commonly held notion of community, which Lingis calls "the rational community." By describing one's life as a story existing from birth at one end to death at the other, this inquiry asserts that an individual's story becomes a part of the "community of memory," where responsibility resides.

—A TV Producer*: Can you understand how meaningless everything is? Everything, I'm talking about. Lives and shows and the whole world. It's meaningless.*
—His Assistant*: Yeah, but you are not dying.*
—A TV Producer*: No, I am not dying NOW. . . . But doesn't that ruin everything for you? You know, it takes pleasure out of everything. I mean, you're gonna die, I'm gonna die, the audience's gonna die, and the network,*

and the sponsor…everything!
—His Assistant*: I know, I know, and your hamster.*
—A TV Producer*: Yes!*
A Woody Allen *movie, Hannah and Her Sisters, 1986*

INTRODUCTION

The question "what is death?" has captured people's minds for a long time. Every attempt to define what death is evokes oppositions and challenges, and there is no universal agreement on what death is even among philosophers and physicians. In many cases, however, searches for the meaning or definition of death are undertaken based on one commonly held assumption. It is that the experience of death, no matter whose it is, is a private affair. When one considers the experience of death, one presupposes that there is a strong sense of a subject–an individual–who faces death. The subject can be oneself or somebody else; yet, in both cases, death–the experience of death–remains a private affair. Others can witness *my* death and grief, but they cannot die *my* death because when *I* die, it is *I* who dies, not someone else. When one commits suicide, it is only the individual who faces death, and when one murders the other for money, it is only the other who faces his or her death. Experiencing death does not include any sense of interference. Death is always *mine* or *the other's*. There is an easy formula of negation of lives; one desires to have money, so that person aims a gun at someone and pulls the trigger, shooting someone dead. Unlike the shooter, the victim faces death because death of the victim is his or her own. Furthermore, if *I* commit suicide because of depression, *I* must face *my* death because *my* death is *my* own.

A question such as "What is death?" is like a story in which death is discussed from a first person point of view. There is an invisible possessive term in the question regarding death. The individualistic quest for death–"What is death?"–is actually asking the following: "What is *my* death?" or "What is the experience of *my* death like?" When encountering the death of the other, people cry, grieve, and mourn, yet the question—"What is death?"—remains unanswered, and people are still haunted by the question, "What is *my* death?" Even for people who are deeply religious, there is a sense of private possession in the notion of death. Each individual has to be judged before the absolute god; the religious notions of death, salvation, incarnation, and nirvana all presuppose that death, along with the afterlife, function as private possessions.[2)] Of course, worshiping gods is a communal activity; however, when one dies, one must face god's judgment alone. No one can hire a lawyer to negotiate with god. No matter how the experience of death has been discussed, quests for the meaning of death or of experiencing death presuppose the strong sense of private possession. *My* death is *my* affair, and *other's* death is *other's* affair. Yet, what if *my* death is not *mine*, or *other's* death is not *other's*? What if death is not a private affair? What if *my* death is also possessed by the other? What if *my* death belongs to something bigger than myself or the other, such as a community? If so, what does death teach us?

The individualistic approach toward death only offers a narrow view because the approach limits death within the private sphere, ignoring the fact that it is embedded in human relationships. The search for objective knowledge or definition of death is mostly undertaken through philosophical, medical, and judicial discourses; however, a comprehensive view of death cannot be presented without grounding the discourse about death in ethical and relational issues. Opposing the individualistic approach toward the meaning of death, this study of communication ethics discusses how death can be viewed as a manifestation of responsibility. By relocating the locus of death from the paradigm of subjectivity to the realm of community, death no longer emerges as the most fearful phenomenon, but as a gift that teaches that each individual's life exists in the web of responsibilities called community. In other words, this is not a philosophical inquiry to disclose the essence of death; rather, it is a study of communication ethics examining the relationship between death and responsibility in order to seek a new perspective to enrich our everyday lives. In the attempt of achieving these aims, this inquiry can be divided into two sections. In the first section, the study discusses two different views of death as our guiding notions. Martin Heidegger discusses death as angst. In contrast, Emmanuel Levinas theorizes death as responsibility. The second portion of this study explores the connections between death and community to argue that a community is a place where "the death of the other" has its meaning. It also discusses characteristics of community in order to distinguish it from the commonly held notion of community, which Lingis calls "the rational community." By examining one's life as a story belonging to genuine community, this study explains that an individual story is embedded in community and that community is where responsibilities are actualized. To avoid confusion, this study does not critique any religious teachings about death and afterlife, not because the study underestimates faith in life beyond death or religious salvation, but because, as Derrida (1993) suggests, "one no longer speaks the same death where one no longer speaks the same language" (p. 24).

MY DEATH AND THE DEATH OF THE OTHER

Various Notions of Death and One Premise of Death

Is death the end or the beginning of something? Does death end a life or offer something? In his eulogy for Emmanuel Levinas, Jacques Derrida (1997/1999a) pays his respect and thankfulness for Levinas' notions, and he especially aims to make sense of Levinas' death by examining Levinas' notion of death and his critique of Heidegger's notion of death. Derrida says "adieu" to Levinas emphasizing that "*a-Dieu"* does not signify the end– "a finality"[3] (p. 13). The life of Levinas was ended by his death, but *he* was not ended even after his death. In other words, Derrida admits that Levinas died, but he denies that Levinas was annihilated. This is the difference between Heidegger and Levinas. Heidegger approaches death as one's private affair. Levinas, in contrast, embeds death within human relationships. This portion of the study examines Heidegger's and Levinas' notions of death

to show that those two approaches reveal death as two different phenomena: angst and responsibility. Before discussing them, different philosophical perspectives of death are presented in order to show how various *languages* disclose the notion of death differently, yet there is one common presupposition: death is *mine*. Russell (2000) offers interesting insight about how medical definition and the diagnosis of death has been changed throughout history. His conclusion is that death cannot be captured with certain terminologies. Outside the realm of physics, death has been discussed religiously and philosophically. This portion of this inquiry offers various notions of death. Death appears as the end to be feared, some kind of departure to afterlife, or nothingness. Even though they are different explanations, these notions share one characteristic of death: death is *mine*.

One of the common premises about death is that death is the moment of separation of the soul from the body. Pope Pius XII (1980) addresses this notion of death when he answers questions regarding resuscitation. The existence of soul presupposes that death is not the ultimate end because another sort of life will follow after physical death. This sort of theory about death is explained thoroughly in Plato's *Phaedo* through the event of Socrates' suicide. Plato (trans, 1999) discusses that death permits the soul to be set free from the body as if from a prison. Although, philosophers do not fear death because they love wisdom, which cannot be captured by the body, but only by the soul, common people who do not have wisdom fear death. The soul is immortal; therefore, people who love wisdom not have fear. In contrast, for common people, death is the end of their lives. Since these more common individuals value what their bodies can experience, a world of physical and temporal pleasures and comforts, when their bodies die, they die. There is no sense of immortality, or hope; therefore death is a fearful phenomenon that lingers in the end of one's life. This presupposition echoes through frameworks of dualism and materialism. According to Feldman (1998), dualists, such as Descartes, believe that people do not cease to have experience at death because their souls continue to live after death. People might go to hell. Therefore, it is reasonable for people to fear death; death can harm them. For materialists, death is an event that one cannot experience or know. The question about the evils of death is ambiguous because some believe that people cannot be harmed by something they cannot even experience; however, people still fear death. Feldman asserts that it is reasonable to understand the metaphysical conception of death because it permits people to obtain an idea, and by obtaining this idea, those who feared death will gain important wisdom that will help to save them from that fear. This is sort of saving people from the fear of death as the ultimate end. Those who believe that death is not followed by any sort of afterlife may think that death makes life meaningless. Arthur Schopenhauer seems to express this idea.

According to Janaway (1998), Schopenhauer is a pessimist and believes that humans as willing beings inevitably leads themselves to suffering, and that a life containing suffering is worse than non-existence. Individuals' lives are always open to suffering. For Schopenhauer, death is not something to fear. Death is the great opportunity no longer to be

I. Humans would live for a while and simply die. If people believe this concept, life would become meaninglessness. Schopenhauer's notion springs to Tolstoy's mind when he searches the meaning of life. Tolstoy (1884/1987), in his memoir, shockingly expresses his despair because he could figure out only that life is nothingness and death is annihilation. Everything–his works, his life, his family–would disappear in the end. He states, quoting Schopenhauer:

> Therefore what remains to us, who are so full of will after the annihilation of the will, is of course nothingness; on the other hand, in those in whom the will has been reversed and renounced, this universe of ours that is so real with all its suns and galaxies is nothingness. (p. 41)

Even though, his despair seems to be incurable, leading him to suicidal thinking, Tolstoy finds comfort in the faith of Christianity when he realizes that questions he is asking are about the infinite meanings, and that answers are not obtainable for him because he is the finite existence. The faith allows the finite to be in the realm of the infinite.

For Nietzsche, Tolstoy's faith would be a target of criticism, just as Nietzsche attacks Socrates' theory. Nietzsche (1872/2000) critiques Socrates who claims to overcome the fear of death through wisdom. Life is a tragedy in the sense that all humans must face the impossibility of finding meaning in both life and death. In Nietzsche's eyes, Socrates is a "demon" who dies pretending to be "the true eroticist" (p. 82, p. 89). Every attempt, knowledge, or faith to overcome death is poison for Nietzsche; therefore, Christianity appears to him as "romantic hypochondria of those whose legs are shaky" (Nietzsche, 1901/1968, p. 410). As one can see, death has been discussed from different points of view. Death is the end, a path to afterlife, or nothingness. Yet, all these notions consist of the same premise that death is the private affair. These approaches presuppose the presence of subject who solely faces death. The subject faces the fearful event, departure to the next life, or meaninglessness. The presupposition of death as a private possession leads us to the point that Heidegger claims: death is always *mine*.

Heidegger: My Death

Martin Heidegger (1927/1996) takes a phenomenological approach ("To the things themselves!") toward Being aiming to disclose possibilities of Being (p. 42). The disclosure emerges from the relationship between human being (Da-sein) and Being. The notion of Da-sein is "being which myself am, its being is in each case mine. . . . [A]n I is always this being, and not others" (p. 108). In other words, it is "*always-being-my-own-being* [*Jemeinigkeit*]" (p. 40). It is natural to follow Heidegger's claim that death is also *mine* since my being is mine and the end of "*always-being-my-own-being"* must be mine.

Heidegger believes that death is not an event as "*being-at-an-end*" (p. 228). It is not something that happens at the end of being, nor is it some kind of an exterior force that ends being. Death is one of many possibilities that Da-sein inherits from the moment being comes into existence. People are dying from the moment they are born. Da-sein always carries this

possibility just as each individual cannot escape the possibility that he or she might die at anytime. Death is, Heidegger argues, "the *ownmost nonrelational, certain, and as such, indefinite and not to be bypassed possibility of Da-sein*" (p. 239). No matter how wealthy one becomes, no matter how many children one has, or no matter what occupation one takes, one's being moves toward this possibility, and no one can bypass it. Every single human being must face his or her own death. No one can substitute others to deal with one's death. If someone were to take a bullet for the other and die, the event does not erase "the *ownmost nonrelational*" possibility in the other. The person who sacrificed his or her life to protect the other died because the person grasped his or her possibility, and the other still has to die later. No one can take *my* death from *me*. A question emerges, however, from the notion of my death. If death is *my* own, can *I* experience it? In other words, how do I know that I die when I die?

Heidegger explains that at the moment of death, Da-sein "loses the being of the there" (p. 221). People know that they will die, although they cannot experience it. The only way they know that Da-sein inherits a possibility of death is that they can access the objective knowledge from the death of the others. Even though Heidegger does not exclude the fact that people coexist with one another (*being-with* others [*Mitda-sein*]), the notion of coexisting does not change the fact that Da-sein is *mine*. *My* death does not happen in the past or in the present, but in the future. Even though one cannot experience death or foresee one's own death, one is able to know there is death and that one will die in the future because people learn the existence of death from others. The death of others is there only to inform us that all individuals die, and each individual's death is his or her own end. Heidegger states that the death of others appears to be:

> a loss, but as a loss experienced by those remaining behind. However, in suffering the loss, the loss of being as such which the dying person "suffers" does not become accessible. We do not experience the dying of others in a genuine sense; we are at best always just "there" too. (p. 222)

To some extent, Da-sein's *Jemeinigkeit,* separates people throughout their lives. The moment that an individual starts his or her life is the moment the individual starts dying. People are living (and dying) together in the world, but they are "at best always just 'there'" with one another.

The major difference between Heidegger and Levinas is that Heidegger does not enthusiastically appreciate communal influence over Da-sein. According to Heidegger, people tend to be lost in "the they" (publicness) in order to escape from the most certain possibility, death. It is important to anticipate the possibility to permit Da-sein to see its authenticity. The anticipation of Da-sein is the individuation of itself, but the anticipation opens up possibilities and reveals its "lostness in the they" (p. 245). There is a strong sense of individuation in Da-sein. Individualizing is a process of disclosure of influence of the outer world over human existence. The authentic Da-sein exists by itself. "The they" separate Da-

sein from its authenticity. Reaching its own possibilities, individualization is the nature of Da-sein. *My* Da-sein is *mine*, and so is *my* death.

Levinas: The Death of the Other

Disagreeing with Heidegger, Emmanuel Levinas (1961/1969) does not limit possibilities of being into one's own existence because "the very exercise of its being consists in exteriority" (p. 291). Being cannot exist by itself; it is shaped beyond its own existence. Therefore, being is not *mine*, yet being is relational. Death, for Levinas (1995/1999), is "the most unknown of unknowns" (p.153). The relationship between one and one's own dying is not formed by knowledge or experience. Levinas (1993/2000) states that the individual's relationship with his or her death is "a nonknowledge"; however, he emphasizes that it does not mean "an absence of relationship" (p. 19). Since *my* death is unknowable, the question regarding *my* death does not concern Levinas; rather he places a relational aspect of death as his primary concern. He discusses the meaning of *my* witnessing the death of the other. Levinas asks, "Is death separable from the relation with other [*autrui*]?" (p. 8). Death is not nothingness, annihilation, or the "ownmost nonrelational" possibility. It is a phenomenon that occurs within human relationships; death is relational as its essence.

Levinas (1993/2000) argues that the death of the other is not "secondhand knowledge nor a privileged experience of death" (p. 13). Rather, the death of the other affects one's identity as *I*. Witnessing the death of the other, *I* is no longer the same; encountering this event changes the witness into "the survivor." The death of the other makes *I* a survivor and charges his or her as guilty for being a survivor. The death of the other reveals the nearness of the other as his or her neighbor. One's neighbor becomes "the non-response" in death, yet the survivor has to respond to the other, "the non-response," because the death of the other provides *I* with "the culpability to be a survivor" (pp. 11-12). The guilt that the survivor feels makes the death of the other the survivor's affair. Levinas states, "*My* death is my *part* in the death of the other. . . . The death of the other is not simply a moment of the mineness of my ontological status" (p. 39). "*My* death" is not mine because it is comprehended by the death of the other. In other words, it is a part of a much larger phenomenon called human relationships. Explaining Levinas' statement above, Llewely (2002) asserts that the relationship with the death of the other is "my participation in the death of the other" (p. 114). The sense of culpability is the weight that the survivor has to carry in order to participate in the relationship. Death is no longer a possibility of *mine*. The death of the other embeds *I* in the relationship with the other as a guilty survivor.

Angst or Responsibility

Two paradigms of death, *my* death and the death of the other, reveal different notions of being with others. *My* death is an individuation of my possibility of being. In contrast, the death of the other keeps one within the relationship with the other who dies and affects one's selfhood. These paradigms of death describe characteristics of death differently: angst and responsibility.

Angst is, Heidegger explains, an essential characteristic of Da-sein. In his explanation, he differentiates angst from fear. Fear is caused by definite objects, and angst occurs for non-objects that no one can point to or explain clearly. Heidegger claims, "The threat itself is, after all, indefinite and thus cannot penetrate threateningly to this or that factically concrete potentiality of being. What Angst is anxious for is being-in-the-world itself" (p. 175). The world blurs the possibilities of Da-sein. Being anxious reveals the most extreme inner worldly possibility of Da-sein; therefore, the world—the outer worldly creations—is revealed as meaningless or nothingness to Da-sein. In angst, Da-sein faces the nothingness of its death. Heidegger explains, "Angst is anxious about the potentiality-of-being of the being thus determined, and thus discloses the most extreme possibility" (p. 245). Angst teaches Da-sein that the outer-worldly meanings of death disappear when Da-sein grasps its "*ownmost nonrelational*" possibility. Thus, angst is the essential characteristic of human life because it only moves toward death. When we die, all beliefs of death, including religious, communal and philosophical teachings, become meaningless because it is only Da-sein that can experience death; death is nothingness.

In contrast, Levinas denies Heidegger's view of death as nothingness by accusing him of limiting its meaning to annihilation. Levinas (1961/1969) states, "The movement of annihilation in murder is therefore a purely relative annihilation, a passage to the limit of a negation attempted within the world" (p. 233). Levinas strongly criticizes this kind of view of death by saying it must be the same as the knowledge Cain had. In support of this, he claims, "The identifying of death with nothingness befits the death of the other in murder" (p. 232). In Levinas' theory, death is not nothingness or annihilation, but, as mentioned above, a relational phenomenon. To offer an example of this theory, Levinas (1947/1978) discusses Shakespeare's text of *Hamlet*. According to Levinas, Hamlet realizes that death is not a form of annihilation or a sort of force that extinguishes one's life into nothingness; Hamlet knows that nothingness is impossible. Levinas asserts that Hamlet's famous utterance–"To be or not to be"–shows Hamlet's "sudden awareness of this impossibility of annihilating oneself" (p.73). Hamlet knows that even though he chooses death, it will not annihilate anything. He is fully aware that his "not to be" will continue to "be" with others just as he is called by his father's "not to be." One may wonder, however, what would happen if Hamlet ignores his father's call. What happens if Hamlet equates his father's death with nothingness? To answer these questions, Levinas (1993/2000) makes a strong claim: the negative ideas of death, namely annihilation and nothingness, are viewed as "hatred or the desire to murder" (p. 8). Death is not an individuated possibility of *mine*. Rather, Levinas suggests that death cannot be investigated without situating it within relations.

As mentioned above, Levinas describes the other who dies as "the non-response," yet the death of the other does not exhaust the relation between *I* and "the non-response." The death of the other affects the identity of *I*, and *I* still must respond for "the non-response" as the guilty survivor. *Hamlet* clearly reveals Levinas' point; Hamlet turns into the guilty

survivor through encountering his father as a ghost and sailing into the unknown. Hamlet's engagements in disclosing the secret of his father's death is not driven by his emotional attachment. In this sense, the death of Hamlet's father emerges as a responsibility to Hamlet. Levinas (1993/2000) explains that responsibility exists beyond emotional relations, fear, courage, or solidarity. The sense of responsibility is far stronger than emotional engagement in the death of the other. Beyond sentiments, the unknown embeds us with in the web of responsibilities, and just as the story of Hamlet opens after witnessing the ghost, one's life becomes driven by the responsibility.

Death does not appear as the end or annihilation of one's life, but rather appears as a call for one to inherit responsibility for those who die. Death informs us that one who lives is "a survivor" who must respond to "the non-response" with responsibility. The death of the other, Levinas (1993/2000) argues, affects one's "nonsubstantial identity, which is not the simple coherence of various acts of identification, but is made up of an ineffable responsibility" (p. 12). On one hand, Heidegger explains that Da-sein is "being-toward-death." In this sense, death always exists in Da-sein and reminds us that we are dying from the time we are born. On the other hand, Levinas asserts our nonsubstantial identities are affected by the death of the other. The death of the other always exists before us and reminds us that we are responsible from the time we are born. As one embeds oneself in a responsible relationship with the death of the other, *my* death is no longer attached to angst. For Levinas (1961/1969), considering death as nothingness or annihilation is "murder"; within the responsible relationship with the death of the other, one dreads committing "murder more than [one's own] death" (p. 246). His condemnation toward the identification of death as annihilation and the disregard of responsibilities, especially his description of these conducts as murder, might appear too critical for some readers. There are, however, series of debates concerning death among medical experts, and their discussions are fueled by the gap between two manifestations of death: angst and responsibility. By examining medical discourses and the notion of community as a critique of the self-centered paradigm, we learn how loudly Levinas' condemnation echoes.

DEATH AND COMMUNITY

From Individuated Death to Death in Community

The fact which complicates the medical issues about death is that there is no universally agreed upon definition of death. Medical discourses about death have faced a series of dilemmas because a patient's death is not a simple phenomenon that can be characterized only judicially and medically. Beauchamp and Perlin (1978) discuss the difficulties of determining death in medical terms. In the simplest definition, "death occurs if and only if there is a total cessation of respiration and blood flow"; however, this definition has been complicated by developments in biomedical technology (p. 1). Even when a patient does not show significant brain activity, the advanced medical technology permits medical

professionals to maintain respiration and heartbeat indefinitely. The always-challenged definition of death causes complex dilemmas for medical experts. According to Munson (2003), debates between the transplant community and bioethicists are grounded in the difficulty of determination of death. Doctors must make the final call on the death of organ donors without risking any chance that the hearts could start again. Simultaneously, they are afraid of deteriorating organs by taking too much time to determine the death of a donor. Salladay (2004) admits that legal and ethical disagreements about death complicate procedures of organ donation and suggests that, in several cases, organs were taken even before donors were legally deceased. Furthermore, Bagheri (2003) points out the close relationship between the socio-cultural issues and the legislation of brain death policy in Japan. The legislation must be clearly formed to erase confusion in the public; however, Bagheri emphasizes, in order for the law of organ procedure to be formed and exercised practically and comprehensively, social expectations, cultural norms, and ethical issues must not be ignored. In other words, death is no longer explained as a private possession or as object that can be categorized judicially or even medically. Death, as we saw in settings around medical ethics, reveals that people are tied by the web of responsibilities. "The unknown" remains unknown; yet it forces people to witness it *responsibly*.

Realizing the impossibility of defining death and the importance of witnessing death responsibly, McIlwain and Browning approach death with the notion of community. In his investigation of American culture around death, McIlwain (2005) examines representations of death, namely public discourse and rituals, through popular culture and highly advanced digital media. He argues that investigating these types of conduct related, in one way or another, to death are more crucial than the attempt to know what will happen after death. His interests reside in the ethical impact of death toward community and how representations of death are shaped and influence communal living. Browning (2005), from the field of medical ethics, argues the need of "a caring community of ordinary people" besides medical professionals when one is facing the end of his or her life (p. 23). He suggests that community-based caring allows the dying to focus more on living well than on the dilemma of euthanasia and assisted suicide. Within community, death is no longer a sheer "standardized experience,"[4] but a part of traditions and narratives of community (p. 32). Works of McIlwain and Browning, although they are different fields of studies, are based on the same premise: individualistic approach toward death narrows the comprehensive picture of death, and there is a close relationship between the limited view of death and our culture.

The individualistic view of death coexists with the disappearance of community. In his criticism of Nietzsche, MacIntyre (1981) suggests that Nietzsche is "*the* moral philosopher of the present age," with whom people become "autonomous moral subjects" (p. 114). The emergence of the autonomous self indicates that people engage in social and civic life with private concerns or with the personal preference, which MacIntyre calls "emotivesm" (p.12). People seem to live together, but it is only the appearance. Without

communal agreement, an individual privately determines moral concerns. Just as the work of Robert Putnam, which McIlwain mentions, indicates, people come to a bowling alley, and, there, they are *Bowling Alone*. Both McIlwain and Browning argue that the notion of death has been discussed mostly within individualistic paradigm[5)]. McIlwain states:

> Through our years of fear and denial of death we have erected an almost impenetrable wall of privacy around the issue of death. . . . The subject of death has long been seen as a private affair, the manifestations of which demonstrate how disconnected we have become from each other, and our unwillingness to fully participate in civic life. (p. 18)

The disagreement between death as a private possession and death's relational characteristic causes the debate between the right of a patient's decision to refuse life-saving medical treatment and the public and religious beliefs of the preservation of life. For example, Cantor (1978) favors a patient's right to refuse life-saving treatment over the judicial enforcement. Opposing this statement, Browning suggests that a patient may be more liable to make a fatal decision while in critical condition because a patient will go through the state of "panicked, suffocating struggle" because of illness; therefore, self-determination easily becomes frantic (p. 28). The point here is not to claim that the self-determination is individualistic. The point is to insist the importance of embedding the self-determination within the web of responsibilities. Browning insists, "Many individuals at life's end have been abandoned to their own self-determination without adequate community support. The needs of caregivers for the dying, typically family members, have been given unsatisfactory attention" (p. 31). Within responsible relationships, death is not angst. With proper care from community, death is not the cause of frantic chaos, either.

As every individual's life cannot exist separated from relations, the self-centered approach toward death lead us to miss the essence of human existence as relational beings; therefore, the search for death through the paradigm of human relations will offer more comprehensive picture of death. Medical ethics, Browning argues, tend to relegate people to construct the moral life with "the 'pro/con' approach" which consequently fails to capture a life within a bigger picture and embraces the notion of the self along with the importance of self-determination; however, Browning emphasizes that individualistic "self-determination means little if the minds made up are not shaped by a virtuous community" (p. 27). In Browning's line of argument, McIlwain suggests that people will to conquer death by attempting to obtain a metaphysical conception of death and that their attempts do not necessary allow "the isolation of life" as well as "the individuality of death more bearable" (p. 14). Finding a place in a community allows people to embrace death. If the objective explanation of death is unattainable, a path to search for the meaning of death is to situate it within the web of responsibilities–community.

Despite their beneficial arguments about the connection of death and community, McIlwain and Browning both do not examine or offer characteristics of community.

McIlwain's notion of community is a generalized one, viewing community as a group of people who share a same interest as he discusses an online community of TV drama fans. As Neil Postman (1999/2000) observes, however, community in the modern life appears only as a place for people who have similar interests, and people tend to forget that they "must negotiate and resolve their difference for the sake of social harmony" (p. 53). Browning discusses the notion of community within the framework of Christianity, describing three elements of the religious community: faith, hope, and love. His discussion about contributions that theological virtues and community can offer to medical ethics is appealing; yet, he does not explain the hazardous characteristics of community, which Burke (1950/1964) points out in his discussion about the notion of identification. Burke argues that as any identification is possible because there is division, any form of inclusion necessarily creates exclusion, and a strong sense of inclusion easily can turn out to be destructive to other forms of inclusions. For instance, Mouw (1983) observes those who have strong faith in biblical authority and divine commandments refuse to practice certain medical treatments. Since these sorts of religious community unit believers with strong faith, the community necessarily has to exclude anything that is against the belief. In this case, certain medical treatments are excluded, even though the rejection of medical support means death of a patient. This sort of *support* from community would not be what Browning means by "adequate community support," yet he is silent on this sort of matter. As Mouw suggests the need of constructing a pluralistic moral scheme that allows Christians to engage in medical questions with their beliefs, community must maintain the balance of inclusion and exclusion. Without the balance, community either collapses or becomes a closed group demanding conformity. Communities have the potential to be destructive or ethical. The Nazi party is an extreme example of a political group requiring conformity, which painfully resulted in the deaths of numerous people of other communities.

As political and religious spheres have faced the difficulty of building genuine community, any form of genuine community seems to have disappeared from the social scene. As Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler, and Tipton (1985) point out, the therapeutic culture has replaced communal activities with the self-centered gatherings. As result, romantic relationships do not consist of the sense of *we*, public relationships become economically and professionally oriented, and civic virtues are lost along the way. Any form of community has become what Alphonso Lingis (1994) calls the rational community. Within the rational community, there is no "the other"; rather there are coworkers, consumers, colleagues, students, and teachers. People do not see the face of the other. They see general information of the other, who has no name or identity. Everything is understood, realized, and rationalized, and simultaneously the essence of community–moral relationship–disappears. The next section of this study examines characteristics of community in order to distinguish community from the rational community which is a sheer form of gathering and conformity. One will see through my discussion that genuine community is where death

becomes responsibility.

Community Revisited

There are three crucial elements for genuine community to exist: a narrative, the other, and plurality. Community, for Aristotle (trans, 1941), is tied to human nature because humans are all, by nature, political animals. Living in a web of relationships with other people is human nature, and the responsible coexistence constitutes community. Every state is a community where people gather and pursue a good life. A good life is grounded in community and therefore cannot be accomplished individually. If each individual lives by his or her personal preference, there would be no community and individuals would be unable to know meanings of good, moral, and virtuous. What carries communal virtues, tradition, and history is called a narrative; a narrative guides people to engage in communal conducts to achieve a good life. No individual controls community because narrative does. Community is a narrative-based place people can learn civility and morality–important compounds of good life. By engaging in a narrative and sharing responsibilities with others, people construct their moral beings. MacIntyre suggests, "We live out narratives in our lives" (p. 212). Since people understand their lives through narratives they engage in, narratives are also crucial components of life to understand others. Community manifests when people gather around a narrative, and they come to understand morality and civility and the impossibility of achieving the good life without the other.

Regarding to the notion of the other, Calvin O. Schrag (1977) emphasizes that the individual self should not be valued over the other in community. He asserts, "Community is constitutive of selfhood. It fleshes out the portrait of the self by engendering a shift of focus from the self as present to itself to the self as present *to*, *for* and *with*, the other" (p. 78). Since the self exists "*to*, *for*, and *with*" others, there is no objectivity in community, and a narrative is intersubjectively constructed. To some extent, nobody stands in the center of community and has control over it. If there is something powerful existing within community, it is a narrative. What differentiates community from a closed group is a community's intersubjectivity. Genuine reciprocity among its members cannot be found in a closed group. A narrative of the group appears as an objective authority that does not allow people to "examine" the narrative but force them to follow messages that the narrative conveys. In other words, a narrative offers us with choices that one can reject or accept. Any sort of persuasion must presuppose rejection or examination because without that presupposition, as Maruyama (1964) states, persuasion becomes compulsion. Community is invitational but never coercive.

Since a moral community respects uniqueness of the other and other communities, it embraces the notion of plurality. In other words, moral community accepts differences. Dietrich Bonhoeffer (1963) points out that community is not merely a gathering of people who have common interests. Community presupposes that each individual is unique; community requires the plurality of individuals. Community emerges when these unique

individuals come to live together by their own will. Because community is built upon the differences between persons and constituted by reciprocal acts of will, conflict is inevitable within community. Bonhoeffer claims that the conflict, or the strife, among acts of wills construct "genuine life" (p. 55). Members of viable community must respect plurality, or differences. Even if a conflict emerges because of plurality within a community, resolution is imperative because community is at stake. Conflict is an enviable element within community, and people must engage in conflict resolutions. This process of facing conflicts enriches genuine life in community. This active engagement with others cannot be sustained by technology-mediated communication because the strength of communal relationships depends on the nearness of the neighbor. Community is developed in the face-to-face relationship.

It is crucial to note that each community must exist without claiming superiority over other communities. The face-to-face interaction forbids individualization of community, just as the individualism cannot exists within the face-to-face relationship. This relationship must be applied to any relationships inside community as well as among communities. As Levinas (1969/1969) explains, the face-to-face is "a final and irreducible relation which no concept could cover without the thinker who thinks that concept finding himself forthwith before a new interlocutor" (p.291). The pluralism of society cannot be built without the face-to-face relationship. Any community that insists in its superiority over others is the form of a closed group, which is the same trap the Nazis party fell into. Levinas emphasizes that if humans were to engage with one another outside the face to face relation, they negate each other because no one looks at each other's face. As mentioned above, the plurality of individuals is a crucial element of community. The plurality of communities is also an important component of society, or the world. Levinas suggests:

> The unity of plurality is peace, and not the coherence of the elements that constitute plurality. Peace therefore cannot be identified with the end of combats that cease for want of combatants, by the defeat of some and the victory of the others, that is, with cemeteries or future universal empires. Peace must be my peace, in a relation that starts from an I and goes to the other, in desire and goodness, where the I both maintains itself and exists without egoism. (p. 306)

Interacting with the other in the face-to-face strengthens bonding within a community, and it also allows people to maintain plurality in the world.

One might wonder, however, if it is possible for people to be responsible for others without being unfair to anyone. Hamlet is responsible for his father's call, yet simultaneously he has to violate his responsibilities not only to Rosencratz and Guildenstern, but also to Ophelia and to most of the other characters in the play. In the light of the political sphere, responsibility demands that individuals choose to be accountable to certain people, although it means they might have to shirk other responsibilities. By suggesting that accepting responsibility causes a dilemma, Derrida (1992/1995) employs the example of Abraham to

illustrate the fact that the conflict among various responsibilities is the essence of human life. In the Biblical passage, Abraham fulfills his duty because of his responsibility to God; however, he simultaneously violates other responsibilities (this means, in his case, not to murder another human being). Derrida explains that when fulfilling one's duty, one betrays his or her obligation to others whom he or she knows or does not know.

Both Levinas and Derrida see the world as the place one is embedded as a result of responsibilities to the others. Agreeing with Levinas, Derrida (1993/1993) believes that, in this space, the "absolute singularity" of death, as well as life, is more than "*problematic*" (p. 22). The moment Derrida departs from Levinas is when he embraces both the ideas of ethical and political responsibility. Elsewhere, Derrida (1999b) points out that "*aporia*," the impossibility of finding one's way, is the condition of ethics because one is situated in "a heterogeneous space" of political and ethical responsibility (p. 73). Derrida asserts, "Decision, an ethical or a political responsibility, is absolutely heterogeneous to knowledge. Nevertheless, we have to know as much as possible in order to ground our decision" (p. 73). Derrida does not cynically suggest that people must surrender to the impossibility of taking responsibility for all relationships with others. As Findlay (2002) suggests, Derrida locates the notion of responsibility somewhere between the metaphysical conception and the anti-foundational pragmatic philosophy. It must be emphasized that *aporia* forbids not the notion of responsibility but the individualistic and metaphysical conceptions of responsibility. *Aporia* is not meant to discourage people from being responsible. It disables us from being responsible for everyone but not from being responsibility for as much as we can. Responsibility is neither the absolute nor a sheer personal preference. As Levinas calls the unity of plurality peace, a community coexists with other communities, just as individuals live with one another. *Aporia* commands us simultaneously to responsibilities and to realize the existence of other responsibilities. There is no singularity of responsibility. Peace embraces all responsibilities.

A Life as a Story and a Part of a Narrative

With discussion about community and the denial of the singularity of death, this portion discusses how an individual's birth and death are tied into human relations. Critiquing individualism, Arnett and Arneson (1999) suggest a community is created when people come together around a narrative and share life with others and claim, "A narrative is corporate story that guides people" (p. 210). Each individual has his or her own story, and when people come together around a narrative and allow the narrative guide their stories. An individual's story does not end within itself. It finds similar stories and transforms itself into a part of a larger story called narrative. A community is a web of responsibilities, and it is constructed by lives of all individuals who are born into it. Each individual exists within a larger whole, such as community. In this sense, one's birth is given and one's death is carried by the larger whole. The world is not a collection of numerous numbers of short stories; it is a large composed novel.

Heidegger explains that death is the end of Da-sein and that the totality of Da-sein is held by it with the other end, namely "birth" (p. 342). In this sense, birth and death make two covers of a book of one's life; Da-sein is presented between them as a story about an individual. If death as an end is nothingness, it is natural to think that the other end is also nothingness. It is quite obvious that birth is not nothingness. One might point out that birth and death are not the same phenomenon because birth, unlike death, is not "the unknown"; it can be medically observed and explained from the point of fertilization, the process of creating a body, to birth. It is, however, crucial to emphasize that all these observations are still "the 'world' and the public way of being interpreted"; these explanations are not what Da-sein grasps as its birth because it is only Da-sein which can experience its birth. But, is there anyone who can describe how the moment of fertilization felt? The observable process of birth is just like the process of the deceased "being taken care of" others (Heidegger, p. 222). Birth and death are the "ends" that hold being; it is the same phenomenon for being. If one is to think that one end is nothingness, the other end would be nothingness too. Yet, it is definite truth that no one is born from nothingness; every single individual is born as a consequence of human relations. Both ends remain "the unknown," yet they are not nothingness; they are relational. And if the ends is not "mineness," but relational, being in-between them are not "mineness," but relational. A life is a creation of "ineffable responsibility" from others.

Death and birth are not nothingness because they are phenomena of human relations; therefore, an individual's life in between covers is meant to be relational, a part of a larger whole. The world is not a collection of various individual short stories; rather it is a novel that is created and maintained by each individual story. One story is just as important an element as another to create a community. Each individual creates his or her story by being driven by a larger story of a community. Simultaneously, he or she becomes a part of the community through his or her participation. A narrative is the essence of community and guides people. A community is a place where an individual shares life with others, where people are responsible to each other, and where no one dies into nothingness. Bellah et al offer the notion of "community of memory" in which individuals can live on as parts of narrative that a community holds (p. 153). The belief that a person continues to live on even after death as a part of a narrative, or as a memory, may appear to be a romanticized notion of death for certain people. For Levinas, however, this is a way in which people place themselves beyond their temporal existence, beyond the limited time of their lives.

Levinas (1961/1969), opposing Heidegger who focuses on the temporality, presents that the essence of time is infinity. Levinas, of course, does not deny that human beings exist within the finitude of time; nevertheless, he asserts that true temporality of being accepts the impossibility of immortality before the infinity of future. Gathering each individual's discontinuity is what Levinas believes constitutes time. The structure of time presupposes the relation between *I* and the other. He states, "Resurrection constitutes the principal event

of time. . . . In continuation the instant meets its death, and resuscitates; death and resurrection constitute time" (p. 284). People will be resurrected by others who gather discontinuous beings–individuals' discontinuous stories. In other words, if there is no other, there is no resurrection, no future, no infinity because being is discontinuous, and there would be no connection among individuals. People will be resurrected when they are invited to become parts of a "community of memory" by others.

Lingis presents a great anecdotic question regarding death and responsibility to show how powerful a community of memory is. Please ask yourself what you would say in the situation as you read the following:

> One is called to the deathbed of a parent, and one, facing her, does not know what to say. Yet one has to say something. The other has arrived at the limit–the limit of her life–when she can do nothing more. But she has yet this to do: to die. It is something she has to do, alone, and without any experience to appeal to, any means or resources. . . . She has always known she will have to do this, has often thought of it, has often willed to die the one way or the other. . . . The nurses say, "I am so glad you have come!" They know you can do, you must do, something they cannot do–say something to the dying one. What can one say? (pp. 107-108)

What would you say? The reason Lingis asks this question is to show us "the limit of the powers of language" (p. 108). That is the place where speechlessness resonates louder than actual speech, where what one says hardly matters, and where proper community resides. What matters is not what you actually say, but your presence at the deathbed, the reason that brought you there, and the fact "that you say something, anything" (p. 109).

In the rational community, the limited powers of language do not exist because what is said is important there. When rational agents in the community utter speeches, these speeches are either the deliberation of information or simply eccentric sentimentality, and both types of speech are made for the sake of what must be said. We see the death total in the war on the evening news, and we see president Bush (2004) stating quite rhetorically, "our prayers are with the soldiers and their loved ones as they're doing the hard work necessary for a free Iraq to emerge" (p. 2808). In the rational community, the death total represents numbers, and the phrase "our prayers" is uttered for a rhetorical impact because there is no "limit of the power of language" and because there is no force that drives rational agents to come to *the deathbed*. In this community, death remains annihilation, *my* possession, and fear. There is no community of memory either. Lingis reminds us that the death of the other becomes a responsibility in community, and the weight of responsibility hits us hard when we find ourselves at the limit of the power of language and when we realize the power of community of memory, or a narrative, that demands us to be at *the deathbed*.

CONCLUSION

Death is the unknown. Instead of discussing various philosophical teachings and religious beliefs of death, this study questions the relational meaning of death: what does death teach us? By examining the difference between *my* death and the death of the other, death reveals itself not as nothingness or a fearful phenomenon that ends one's life but as relational phenomenon of human beings. The death of the other embeds people in a web of responsibilities. Each individual is like a discontinuous story that exists between two *covers*, namely birth and death. Yet, this discontinuous being continues to live on within genuine community where each story transforms into a part of a larger whole, a narrative. In contrast, the rational community does not carry a narrative; rather, it embraces the power of language. This community does not contain the power to transform death into responsibility; death is a private possession and the fearful end.

Bellah et al. describe a real community as "community of memory because communities are constituted by their past" (p. 153). Individuals in communities are important part of the tradition that is essential to a community of memory. If one would like to keep one's own story unread by others, the story would disappear as he or she disappears when the story ends. On the contrary, if one believes his or her story is a part of a community of memory, one's birth and death are not one's own, and one's life remains as a part of community of memory even after his or her death. Bellah et al. state that a genuine community of memory also carries painful stories. Communities are not there to divorce pain and sadness from death. Nothing can stop people from shedding tears when encountering loved ones' deaths; however, they assert, "the communities of memory that tie us to the past also turn us toward the future as communities of hope" (p. 153). The sadness of losing loved ones leaves the same pain no matter how many thinkers aim to reveal meanings of death; yet, there should be a hope because death is not nothingness. Even though death is a phenomenon filled with sorrow, it surely can be transformed into hope. Community carries hope that is stronger than emotional attachment and denies the notion that death is nothingness. Through his suicide, Socrates proves just that.

Discussing Socrates' suicide in *Phaedo*, Levinas (1993/2000) explains that Plato does not ignore the unbearable emotional impact of witnessing the other dying. Apollodorus and women, who are lost in solitude and cry for Socrates, have to be excused from the place where Socrates explains about the dualistic notion of death and eventually drinks poison hemlock. According to Levinas, the theme of *Phaedo* is "theory is stronger than the anxiety over death" (p. 18). Socrates offers the theory of philosophical knowledge that can overcome the anxiety of death. Levinas offers the theory of responsible relationship with the other that is stronger than the anxiety of death. As mentioned above, Levinas equates considering death as a form of negation, namely nothingness or annihilation, with murder. The death of the other situates the guilty survivors in a web of responsibilities, in a community, and a society. When people ignore their responsibilities, they become murders. Everyone dies: "I,"

"you," "the sponsor," "the audience," "the other," and even "a hamster." If one finds the fact terrifying, it means that one believes death is a private affair.

Why do I have to die? Why do my friends, my beloved, my family members have to die? What did I do wrong to deserve all those tragedies? Why good people? Why not unmoral people? These questions are already posed by Job to God, as he accuses God of unfair conduct. In his discussion about the Book of Job, Fingarette (1983) claims that the common understanding of the book as the discussion of God's law misses the essence of the book. The failure of Job, as well as readers, is conceptualizing God's conduct as the law and thinking of the relationship between humans and God in terms of punishment and reward. The failure happens because, as Tolstoy realizes, the finite existence cannot comprehend the infinite. God's conduct, rather than being the law in this story, is a poem, in which "we are allowed a vision of existence as inexhaustibly rich in creative energies. We see life and death, harmonies and discords, joys and terrors, grace and monsters, the domestic and the wild" (p. 269). Death is not the law. Death is a song: a song which allows the finite existence to enter the realm of the infinite. Death is no longer a fearful phenomenon, nothingness, or meaningless; rather it becomes a gift of responsibility and it teaches that people must fear committing *murder*.

In this particular moment, the world is full of sorrow of losing people's lives because of natural disasters, wars, violence, and disease, as we see in the news on an everyday basis. Feeling sad for them is not equivalent to accepting responsibilities from those who die. Because we do not take enough responsibility, Lingis would claim that we are rational agents. Worse, Levinas would call us children of Cain. In community where death transforms itself into responsibility, people must be at the limit of the power of language, *the deathbed*. Accepting responsibilities demands us to be speechless, to volunteer, to donate, to attend ecological discourses, to march miles and miles for peace, to engage in public debates, to offer care for patients, etc–this list never ends. Through these acts, we strengthen, broaden, and deepen narratives. Or we might create new narratives. Witnessing the death of the other is "not only the end of language," Lingis argues, but "also the beginning, the beginning of communication" (p. 114). Death is the unknown. We can capture it only in relational terms. With the realization of this idea, we can start a new line of communication–a communication guided by community, and this sort of communication demands that we sing the song of death.

NOTES

1) I extend my sincere thanks to all the reviewers for their suggestions. Special thanks to Professor Miyahara and Professor Ookuma for *the gift* that has changed my life.
2) Kenneth Burke (1961) argues that the symbolic meaning of death in Christianity is "a kind of *capital punishment*" in the socio-political order. In this sense, an individual's death is his or her own capital punishment.

3) Derrida (1995) offers three meanings of "adieu":

I. The salutation or benediction given (before all constative language "adieu" can just as well signify "hello," "I can see you," "I see that you are there," I speak to you before telling you anything else–and in certain circumstances in French it happens that one says *adieu* at the moment of meeting rather than separation);

II. The salutation or benediction given at the moment of separation, of departure, sometimes forever (this can never in fact be excluded), without any return on this earth, at the moment of death;

III. The *a-dieu*, for God or before God and before anything else or any relation to the other, in every other adieu. Every relation to the other would be, before and after anything else, an adieu. (p. 47)

4) According to Browning, in her book titled *On Death and Dying*, Elisabeth Kübler-Ross explains the five stages of death: denial, anger, bargaining (attempt to gain time), depression, and acceptance. In addition, learning from Kübler-Ross, Allen D. Goldhamer (1973) analyzes a medieval drama, *Everyman*, to show how the protagonist in the story goes through the five stages of dying.

5) Kenneth V. Iserson (1994) offers the example of the individuated death in current American society. He says that certain states, such as Arizona, allow individuals "to specify in advance directives if they do not wish to be kept alive in persistent vegetative states; the rest of the options may soon be available elsewhere. Then, each individual will be able to define death for himself" (p. 15).

REFERENCES

Allen, W. (Director/Writer). (1986). *Hannah and her sisters* [Motion picture]. United States: Orion Pictures.

Arnett, R. C., & Arneson, P. (1999). *Dialogic civility in a cynical age: Community, hope, and interpersonal relationship*. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.

Aristotle (1941). *Politics*. In R. McKeon (Ed.), *The basic works of Aristotle* (pp. 1127-1316). New York: Random House.

Bagheri, A. (2003). Criticisms of "brain death" policy in Japan. *Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal*, 13, 359-372.

Beauchamp, T. L., & Perlin, P. (1978). *Ethical issues in death and dying*. Englewood, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Bellah, R. N., Madsen, R., Sullivan, W. M., Swidler, A., & Tipton, S. M. (1985). *Habits of the heart: Individualism and commitment in American life*. New York: Harper & Row, Publishers.

Bonhoeffer, D. (1963). *Communion of saints: A dogmatic inquiry into the sociology of the church*. (R. G. Smith, Trans.). New York: Harper & Row Publishers.

Burke, K. (1961). *The rhetoric of religion: Studies in logology*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Burke, K. (1964). *A rhetoric of motives*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. (Original work published 1950)

Bush, G. W. (2004). Remarks to reporters following a visit with wounded troops at walter reed army medical center. *Weekly Complication of Presidential Documents*, 40, 2807-2808.

Browning, P. D. (2005). Community care of the dying: Beyond the euthanasia debate. *Encounter*, 66, 23-44.

Cantor, N. L. (1978). A patient's decision to decline life-saving medical treatment. In T. L. Beauchamp & S. Perlin (Eds.), *Ethical issues in death and dying* (pp. 203-213). Englewood, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Derrida, J. (1993). *Aporias: Dying—awaiting (one another at) the "limit of truth."* (P.-A. Brault & M. Nass, Trans.). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. (Original work published 1993)

Derrida, J. (1995). *The gift of death*. (D. Willis, Trans.). Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. (Original work published 1992)

Derrida, J. (1999a). *Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas*. (P.-A. Brault & M. Nass, Trans.). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. (Original work published 1997)

Derrida, J. (1999b). Hospitality, justice and responsibility: A dialogue with Jacques Derrida. In R. Kearny & M. Dooley (Eds.), *Questioning ethics: Contemporary debates in philosophy* (pp. 65-83). New York: Routledge.

Feldman, F. (1998). Death. In *Routledge encyclopedia of philosophy* (Vol. 1, pp. 817-823). New York: Routledge.

Findlay, E. F. (2002). Secrets of European responsibility: Jacques Derrida on responsibility in the philosophy of Jan Patočka. *Philosophy Today*, 46, 16-30.

Fingarette, H. (1983). The meaning of law in the book of Job. In S. Hauerwas & A. MacIntyre (Eds.), *Revisions: Changing perspectives in moral philosophy*, (pp. 249-289). Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dome Press.

Goldhamer, A D. (1973). Everyman: A dramatization of death. *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 59, 87-89.

Heidegger, M. (1996). *Being and time*. (J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson, Trans.). Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. (Original work published 1927)

Iserson, K. V. (1994). *Death to dust: What happens to dead bodies?* Tucson, AZ: Galen Press.

Janaway, C. (1998). Schopenhauer, Arther. In *Routledge encyclopedia of philosophy* (Vol. 8, pp. 545-554). New York: Routledge.

Levinas, E. (1969). *Totality and infinity: An essay on exteriority*. (A. Lingis, Trans.). Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press. (Original work published 1961)

Levinas, E. (1978). *Time and the other [and additional essays]*. (R. A. Cohen, Trans.). Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press. (Original work published 1947)

Levinas, E. (1999). *Alterity and transcendence*. (M. B. Smith, Trans.). New York: Columbia

University. (Original work published 1995)

Levinas, E. (2000). *God, death, and time*. (B. Bergo, Trans.). In W. Hamacher & D. E. Wellbery (Eds.), Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. (Original work published 1993)

Lingis, A. (1994). *The community of those who have nothing in common*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.

Llewelyn, J. (2002). *Appositions of Jacques Derrida and Emmanuel Levinas*. Bloomington, IN: Indianapolis University Press.

MacIntyre, A. (1981). *After virtue: A study in moral theory*. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.

Maruyama, Masao (1964). *Gendaiseiji no sisou to koudou*. [Thoughts and actions of the modern politics]. Tokyo: Miraisya.

McIlwain, C. D. (2005). *When death goes pop: Death, media, and the remaking of community*. New York: Peter Lang Publishing.

Mouw, R. J. (1983). Biblical revelation and medical decisions. In S. Hauerwas & A. MacIntyre (Eds.), *Revisions: Changing perspectives in moral philosophy*, (pp. 182-202). Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dome Press.

Munson, R. (2003, January 15). Wait for life; doctors use different kinds of evidence to determine when death has occurred. *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, p. B3.

Nietzsche, F. (1968). *The will to power*. (W. Kaufman & R. J. Hollingdale, Trans.). New York: Vintage Books. (Original; work published 1901)

Nietzsche, F. (2000). *The birth of tragedy*. (W. Kaufman, Eds & Trans.). *Basic writing of Nietzsche* (pp.15-144). New York: The Modern Library. (Original work published 1872)

Plato. (1999). *Phaedo*. (W. H. D. Rouse, Trans.). In E. H. Warmington (Ed.), *The great dialogues of Plato* (pp.460-521). New York: Penguin Books.

Pope Pius XII. (1980). The prolongation of life: An address of Pope Pius XII to an international congress of anesthesiologists. In D. J. Horan & D. Mall (Eds.), *Death, dying and euthanasia*, (pp. 281-287). Frederick, MD: University Publications of America.

Postman, N. (2000). *Building a bridge to the 18th century: How the past can improve our future*. New York: Vintage Books. (Original work published 1999)

Russell, T. (1999). *Brain death: Philosophical concepts and problems*. Burlington, VT: Ashage.

Sallady, S. A. (2004, August). Defining Death. *Nursing*, 34, from http://proquest.uni.com.authenticate.library.duq.edu/pqdqweb?index=20&did=677178451&SrchMode=3&sid=1&Fmt=4&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1117819966&clientId=3262&aid=1

Schrag, C. O. (1977). *The self after postmodernity*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Tolstoy, L. (1987). *A Confession*. In F. Kentish (Ed & Trans.), *A confession and other religious writings*, (pp. 17-80). New York: Penguin Books. (Original work published 1884)